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phenomena. The whole doctrine of transcendent being, in short, is developed with so little care that it can not be allowed to stand even as a plausible metaphysical hypothesis.

Criticism must be offered, too, of what is said of the continuity of consciousness, and of the "activity of manifestation." Neither in the original text nor in the appendix are these views clearly expounded. The same is true of the doctrine of *Allbeseelung*. This view, while central for the author, is scarcely more than outlined: certainly, its more serious difficulties are not even faced.

But the greatest defect of the book is its inadequate treatment of the concepts of time, space, and change. With regard to the new efforts to achieve a dynamic metaphysics the book really takes no stand. It is so largely concerned with the recapitulation of older views that it has neither time for nor interest in the newer developments of thought. One would suppose that a metaphysics of nature would at least take cognizance of such work as that of Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, Russell, Ward, Avenarius. If these men are mentioned at all—and some of the names do not even appear on the pages—it is only in swift passing, never in the serious effort to grapple with their views. In short, as a metaphysics of *nature*—so sadly needed—the book is far from being a success. With its ponderous effort to build up an empty hypothesis, it will serve as one more cause for scientists to smile at the vague futilities of philosophy.

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A Text-book of Psychology. EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. Part I. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. Pp. xvi + 311. \$1.50.

The scope of this book is indicated by the following quotation from the preface: "The present work has been written to take the place of my 'Outline of Psychology.' The 'Outline,' which was stereotyped in 1896, had long passed beyond the possibility of revision, and the continued demand for it showed that there was still room in the science for a text-book which set experimental methods and experimental results in the forefront of discussion." As compared with the "Outline," the present "Text-book" bids fair, when its second volume is added, to run to about twice the size. In regard to style, it has by no means, as the author had feared, lost any of "the freshness and vigor of the first writing." It is distinctly written for students rather than for the psychologist; the student and his needs are constantly borne in mind, and uncommon care is taken to interest him in the questions at issue before plunging him into the sea of psychological discussion.

The present volume covers the quality and intensity of sensation, feeling, and attention. There is also a brief chapter on synesthesia and the image.

The primary emphasis of the book is on the descriptive, or analytic, type of psychologizing—on the discovery of conscious elements and their manner of combination. But teachers who prefer to lay the emphasis elsewhere will be glad to see that the treatment is by no means one-sided

in this respect, since each chapter contains a careful study of the dependence of the conscious event on the stimulus and of its probable physiological interpretation. For example, the chapter on vision, which contains 34 pages as compared with six in the earlier work, owes its increased size mostly to the inclusion of such topics as contrast, adaptation, peripheral vision, color blindness, and the physiological theories of color vision; and the newer and older treatments of the other senses compare in much the same way. At the same time, much of the new matter is introspective; some of it consists of minute and yet graphic descriptions of particular sensory experiences. For example (p. 146): "If with the point of a pencil you brush one of the hairs that are sparsely scattered over the back of the hand, you obtain a weak sensation, of bright quality, which is somewhat ticklish, and which though thin and wiry yet has a definite body. . . . As the pressure [on the skin] is increased, the sensation too becomes heavier, more solid: at times it has about it something springy, tremulous, elastic; at times it appears simply as a little cylinder of compact pressure. Finally, at still higher intensities, the sensation becomes granular: it is as if you were pressing upon a small hard seed embedded in the substance of the skin. The granular sensation is often tinged with a faint ache, due to the admixture of a pain sensation; and is sometimes attended by a dull, diffuse sensation derived from the subcutaneous tissues."

Many changes in the subject-matter are due to the progress of the science; old conclusions have been abandoned, old theories modified. The author's method is to present the conclusions which seem to him the best at the present time; to admit that there is doubt as to their final validity, but not to worry the student with a maze of conflicting views and evidence. His judgment as to which conclusions have the best claim to be so presented will, probably, at most points, meet with general approval. In the chapter on "affection," he is frankly on controversial ground, and abandons to some extent his usual method, threshing out conflicting views with considerable labor. It is doubtful if the student can winnow enough grain from this chapter to pay for the labor. If the descriptive psychology of feeling must begin with the statement (p. 231) that "affection lacks the attribute of clearness," then it may as well end right at that point. If it is of the nature of feeling that "we can not attend to an affection at all; if we attempt to do so, the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us and disappears, and we find ourselves contemplating some obtrusive sensation or image which we had no desire to observe"—then the psychologist should take this fact to heart and devote his attention to something less inaccessible.

The chapter on attention also is debatable ground, but here there is much of undoubted value, regarding the conditions of attention, its development, range, duration, and accommodation. The purely descriptive psychology of the attentive consciousness, however, seems to reduce to the statements that attention is equivalent to clearness, and that there may simultaneously be present in consciousness parts that are clear and parts that are not clear. Now "clearness" must be admitted to be a figure of

speech, and the relevance of the figure is so far defined only negatively. Clearness is distinguished from intensity of sensation, since we can attend to a weak stimulus; it might also be distinguished from simplicity, since we can attend to a complex clang as well as to a pure tone; from distinctness or precision, since we can attend to an object in indirect vision to the neglect of the better-defined object in direct vision; and from any characteristic of sensation you please, since any one can either be or not be the object of attention. It would seem, further, that clearness can not be identified with prominence in consciousness, since the feelings, which can not be clear, can certainly be prominent. In short, the attempt to describe the consciousness of a moment as made up of the clear and the unclear leads to a curious paradox. For the fundamental distinction between the clear and the unclear can not be made in purely descriptive terms, and does not arise within any moment considered by itself. To reach a distinction between the clear and the unclear, each of them must receive some measure of attention; but the unclear is just that which is not attended to, and this precludes the making of the distinction. No one can say at any moment, "This I am attending to, while that I am not attending to." It would have to be, "That I was not attending to a moment ago," and the "that" would be an object, not an item of consciousness. The former item has been replaced by a new one; consciousness has changed, and in so far as the change is one in the distribution of clearness, it can only be defined by reference to the objects apprehended. Clearness, in relation to attention, can mean only clearness in the apprehension of objects, and the test of clearness can not be found in any one moment of consciousness. Attention offers no genuine problem to the descriptive psychologist; the questions which it raises are of a dynamic or of a physiological nature. In reality, it is to such questions that the bulk of the author's chapter on attention is devoted; the description of the attentive consciousness, though ostensibly the main purpose of the chapter, can easily be relegated to the background. All in all, with the probable exception of the chapter on feeling, the book can be used to good advantage by teachers of varying shades of opinion regarding the proper emphasis in psychology; and they will await the appearance of the second volume with unusual interest.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. 53, Heft 2 and 3, September 2, 1909. *Über die heterochrome Helligkeitsvergleichung* (pp. 113-179): DR. HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD. — Direct heterochromatic brightness comparisons are possible and with practise yield constant results. The same color varies in apparent brightness with the "Einstellung" of the observer. Attention to color tone decreases brightness. With "Einstellung" toward brightness the usual order of yellow, orange, red, is reversed. Discussion of methods of color photometry with complete